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CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS  LAW  OF  REPARATION
T HE  following  propositions  have  been  asserted  by  writers  on
the  law  of  Scotland:  (i)  that  the  Scots  law  of  reparation  is
founded  upon  a  principle  of  culpa,  (ii)  that  the  principle  is  derived
from  Roman  law,  in  particular  from  the  lex  Aquilia,  and  (iii)  that
the  word  culpa  in  this  context  has  a  wide  sense  and  expresses  a
liability  for  dolus  and  culpa  in  a  narrow  sense.  Culpa  in  the  wide
sense  is  expressed  to  be  fault  and  in  the  narrow  sense  negligence.1
To  some  extent  these  propositions  are  derived  from,  or  at  least
have  the  same  content  as,  observations  made  by  judges  when  con-
sidering  the  conditions  of  liability  in  the  law  of  reparation.
Two  types  of  judicial  observation  may  be  noted.  The  word
culpa  may  be  used  and  explained  with  the  addition  of  a  synonym,
negligence,2  fault,3  tort,4  or  quasi-delict.5  Or  one  may  have  explicit
statements  that  the  basis  of  the  law  of  reparation  is  culpa  or  that
a  necessary  condition  for  the  attachment  of  liability  is  proof  of
culpa.  Sometimes  a  reference  to  Roman  law  is  made.6
1 Gf.  Guthrie  Smith,  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Reparation  (1864),  8,  58  et  seq. ;
Glegg,  A  Practical  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Reparation,  2nd  ed.  (1905),  8  et  seq.,
19  et  seq.;  Smith,  A  Short  Commentary  on  the  Law  of  Scotland  (1962),  283,  657
et  seq.,  663  et  seq. ;  Walker,  The  Law  of  Delict  in  Scotland-I  (1966),  32,  47  et
seq. ;  Elliott  (1952)  64  J.R.  1,  4,  8;  ~1954)  66  J.R.  10,  16,  19,  29;  Gow  65
(1953),  17 et  seq.,  20,  35  et  seq.  Smith  and  Gow  consider  that  culpa  is  more  com-
prehensive  than  negligence  or  intention  and  negligence,  but  do  not  contest  that  the
law  of  reparation  is founded  upon  culpa.
2 Examples  are  too  numerous  for  a  complete  list  to  be  given,  but  cf.  Finlay  v.
Thomson  (1842)  4  D.  776,  782  per  the  Lord  Ordinary;  Fleeming  v.  Orr  (1853)  15
D.  486,  488  per  Lord  Wood;  Cleghorn  v.  Taylor  (1856)  18 D.  664,  671  per  Lord
Cowan;  Clark  v.  Armstrong  (1862)  24  D.  1315,  interlocutor  of  the  court;  Mackin-
tosh  v.  Mackintosh  (1864)  2  M.  1357,  1364 per  Lord  Inglis;  Campbell  v.  Kennedy
(1864)  3  M.  121,  124  per  Lord  Benholme  and  126  per  Lord  Inglis;  Owners  of  the
"[slay"  v.  Patience  (1892)  20  R.  224,  227  per  Lord  Kinnear;  Miller  v.  Robert
Addie  and  Sons'  Collieries,  1934  S.C.  150,  160 per  Lord  Murray,  1934 S.L.T.  160.
3 Cf.  Lord  Gifford  in  Chalmers  v.  Dixon  (1876)  3 R.  461,  467,  Woodhead  v.  Gartness
Mineral  Go.  (1877)  4  R.  469,  504;  Moffatt  and  Co.  v.  Park  (1877)  5  R.  13,  17.
See also  Bourhill  v.  Young's  Executor,  1941 S.C.  395,  415  per  Lord  Mackay,  1941
S.L.T.  364,374.
4 Horn v. North British Ry. (1877)  5 R. 1055,  1067  per Lord Ormidale.
15  Cf.  Harpers  v.  Great  North  of  Scotland  Ry.  (1886)  13  R.  1139,  1148  per  Lord
Young.
6 Machargs  v.  Campbell  (1767)  Mor.  12541,  argument  of  the  pursuer;  Laurent  v.
Lord  Advocate  (1869)  7  M.  607,  614  per  Lord  Kinloch;  Moffatt  &  Co.  v.  Park
(1877)  5  R.  13,  17  per  Lord  Gifford;  Owners  of  the  "[slay  "  v.  Patience  (1892)
20 R.  224,  227 per  Lord  Kinnear;  Bourhill  v.  Young's  Executor,  1941 S.C.  395,  1941
S.L.T.  415  per  Lord  Mackay;  McLaughlan  v.  Craig,  1948  S.C.  599,  610  et  seq.,
1948  S.L.T.  483  per  Lord  Cooper;  Hamilton  &  Co.  v.  Anderson  &  Co.  1953  S.C.
129,  137  per  Lord  Cooper;  Hester  v.  MacDonald,  1%1  S.C.  370,  390  per  Lord
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On the whole statements which assert that the law of reparation
is founded  upon  a principle  of culpa  derived from  Roman  law are
of  a fairly  late  date.  The  general remarks  on  the  conditions  for
delictual  liability  to  be  found  in  the  works  of  the  institutional
writers  are  phrased with  greater  caution.  Stair,  in  his  discussion
of  obligations  by  delinquence,7 does not  specify  a requirement  of
fault;  he distinguishes the general types of  damage which  are repar-
able  and  proceeds with  a  consideration  of  various  special  delin-
quencies.  By  contrast  Bankton,8  in  his  treatment  of  " damage
which  arises from  diminishing,  spoiling  or destroying one's goods,"
emphasises the element of  fault.  Liability  in  these cases, he sug-
gests,  is determined by the rule
" that  where damage occurs, through  any fault  of  the  person
who  occasions it,  the  same must  be  repaired  to  the  person
aggrieved,  either  by  him  or  his  employer;  but  if  it  was acci-
dental, and could  not  be prevented by  the utmost  care of  the
other,  he who  suffers the damage has no remedy."  9
In  evaluating  this  statement  one should  remember  that  Bankton
is not  describing the basis of  the law  of reparation  but formulating
a  rule  applicable  to  a  special  type  of  damage.  He  does not  use
the  word  culpa;  nor  does he specify  what  is  to  be understood  by
fault.  Whether  the courts  applied  so general a rule  as that  stated
by  Bankton  even in  the area of  damage which  he designates is at
least to be taken as uncertain.
Erskine  10 has the  following  argument.  The  precept  alterum
non  laedere established by  J  ustinian  entails  that  " everyone  who
has the  exercise of  reason, and  so can  distinguish  between right
and  wrong,  is  naturally  obliged  to  make  up  the  damage befalling
his neighbour  from  a wrong  committed  by  himself."  A  person is
liable  not  only  for  " every fraudulent  contrivance  or  unwarrantable
act  by  whidl  another  suffers  damage "  but  also  for  " blameable
omission or neglect of duty."  In general he will  not be liable unless
there  has  been  some  ., culpable  act  or  omission."  He  does not
refer  to  the lex Aquilia  except in connection with  the rule  that  the
Guthrie,  1961  S.L.T.  414;  Henderson  v.  John  Stuart  (Farms)  Ltd.,  1963  S.C.  245,
250  et  seq.  per  Lord  Hunter,  1963 S.L.T.  22.  Many  other  cases contain  dicta  refer-
ring  to  actions  in  respect of  culpa.
7 Stair,  The  Institutions  of the  Law  of Scotland,  I.IX.
8 Bankton,  An  Institute  of the  Laws  of Scotland,  I.X.IV.
9 Ibid.,  para.  41.
10  Erskine,  An  Institute  of the  Law  of Scotland.  III.I.XIIl.15 CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS LAW  OF  REPARATION
assessment of  damages does not  take  into  account  pretium  aIJec-
tionis.  It  is difficult  to  extract  from  Erskine's  discussion the con-
clusion  that  he  based tQe law  of  reparation  upon  a principle  of
culpa  derived  from  the  Roman  law.11  Bell's  brief  account  of  the
..general  principles  of  the  obligation  to  repair  damage "  contains
no analysis of  fault  and makes no reference to culpa  or  to Roman
law .12
The  institutional  writers  do  not  support  the  assertion that  the
Scots law  of  reparation  is based upon a principle  of  culpa  derived
from  Roman  law.  Is  SUppOft to  be derived  from  cases decided
by  the  courts  in  the  seventeenth, eighteenth  and  nineteenth  cen-
turies ?  The  approach  I  have adopted  is to  investigate  the  occur-
rence of  the word  culpa  in  the reasoning employed  by  judges and
advocates.  My  basic assumption  has been that  if  their  reasoning
expressed in  terms  of  culpa  does not  disclose acceptance of  the
proposition  that  the  law  of  reparation  is  based upon  a  principle
of  culpa,  assertions of  this  proposition  to  be found  in  the  later
cases and  in  academic  writings  should  not  be  taken  as correct.
That  is, they  should not  be taken  as an accurate statement of  the
historical  development  of  the  law  of  reparation.  They  may  be
correct  in a different  sense.  Once a line of judgments has affirmed
that  the  law  of  reparation  is based upon  a principle  of culpa,  this
affirmation  becomes authoritative  and  takes  its  place  among  the
principles  employed for  the development of  the law.
I  have  divided  the  cases into  two  groups,  those dealing  with
liability  for  damage to property  and those dealing with  liability  for
the  infliction  of  death or  physical  injury .Within  the  first  group
the  cases, apart  from  a  few  miscellaneous  ones, concern  either
liability  for  damage caused by  the conduct  of  a dangerous activity
or  the existehce of  premises in  a dangerous condition,  or  liability
for  damage caused by animals.  In  both  these situations  there is a
particular  reason for  the emphasis upon  culpa  to  be found  in  the
language  of  advocates and  judges.  There  was  some uncertainty
whether  a person was strictly  liable  for  the state of  his  premises,
the  conduct  of  inherently  dangerous activity  or  the  behaviour  of
his  animals.  Hence  maintenance  of  the  view  (which  eventually
triumphed)  that  there  was no  liability  without  fault  required  em-
--- ~
11 He  cites  Paul  74  ad  ed.  D.50.17.151:  nemo  damnum  facit,  nisi  qui  id  fecit,  quod
facere  ius  non  habe1.  But  the  Scots law  of  reparation  cannot  be  said  to  be  derived
from  this  maxim.
12 Bell,  Principles  of  the Law  of  Scotland,  paras,  543, 544, 553.16 CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS  LAWOF  REPARATION
phatic  expression.  This  not  unnaturally  was found  in frequent  use
of the language of culpa.
The  miscellaneoJls cases need  little  comment  On  occasion
when compensation  is sought for  damage to property  an argument
is  made  or  a judgment  given  that  the facts  disclose culpa  on the
part  of  the  defender.  Thus  the  reckless and  indifferent  running
down  of  one boat by another is alleged by the pursuers to be culpa
latissima,13  knowledge by the defender's servant that a horse stabled
with  the  pursuer  was  diseased is  alleged  by  the  pursuer  to  be
culpa,14 the circumstances responsible for  the collapse of  a store 15
and for  damage sustained by a ship in harbour  16  are characterised
as culpa,  and, in  one case, breach of a statute is held to be culpa.11
Of  the  cases on  dangerous activities  and  dangerous premises
one may consider first  those on liability  for  fire.  The earlier cases,
from  the  seventeenth and  eighteenth  centuries, exhibit  arguments
drawn from  the Roman  law framed  in terms of  culpa.  In  Sibbald
v. Rosyth  18  an action was brought  by a landlord  against the tenants
of  property  which  had  been destroyed by  fire.  One of  the  argu-
ments advanced by the pursuer was that  under  the lex Aquilia  the
defenders were liable  for  culpa  levissima and  that  in  any case by
Roman  law  fires  were  presumed  to  arise  ex culpa  inhabitantium
(citing  D.l.15.3.4).  A  few  years later  in  Farquarharson  v.  Gillan-
ders 19  an action  was brought  in  respect of  the burning  down  of  a
church.  The defenders alleged that the presumption  that fires arose
ex culpa  inhabitantium  applied  only  to  dwelling  houses.  In  reply
the  pursuer  put  an argument  amounting  to  the assertion that  the
defender was liable  on  the ground  of  culpa  since he had  not  dis-
played  the  diligentia  which  a  prudent  paterfamilias  would  have
exercised in the conduct  of his own affairs.  In  a muirburning  case
from  the middle  of  the eighteenth century,  Gordon  v.  Grant,20 the
defenders  argued  on  the  basis of  D.9.2.30.3  that  they  were  not
liable  for  the escape of  the fire  and the consequent damage to  the
13 Forfar  and  Moyes  v.  Stark  (1712) 4 B.S. 888.
1.  Baird  v.  Graham  (1852)  14 D.  615  and  cf.  the  judgment  of  the  Lord  Ordinary.
15 Caledonian  Ry.  v.  Greenock  Sacking  Co.  (1875)  2  R.  671,  judgment  of  the  Sheriff,
affirmed  on  appeal.
]6  Niven  v.  Ayr  Harbour  Trustees  (1897)  24  R.  883,  judgment  of  the  Lord  Ordinary,
reversed  on  appeal.
17 Macfarlane  v.  Colam,  1908  S.C.  56,  (1908)  15  S.L.T.  451,  judgment  of  the  Sheriff.
substitute,  reversed  on  appeal.
18 (1685) Mor.  13978.  19 (1698) 4  B.S. 400.
20 (1765)  Mor.  7356.  The  defenders  were  not  owners  of  the  land  on  which  they
started  the  fire;  but  they  appear  to  have  had  some  right  or  privilege  to  burn  the
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pursuer's  wood.  According  to  the  law  laid  down  in  that  text  they
were  not  liable  ob  dolum  aut  culpam  unless  they  had  kindled  muir-
burn  on  a  windy  day  or  by  ~relessness  allowed  the  fire  to  reach
the  pursuer's  wood.
One  may  infer  from  these  cases  that  in  actions  arising  out  of
damage  caused  by  fire  arguments  drawn  from  Roman  law,  ex-
pressed  in  terms  of  culpa,  were  addressed  to  the  court.  These
arguments  form  part  only  of  the  case  presented  by  the  pursuer
or  defender  and  it  is  not  clear  from  the  judgments  what  weight
the  court  attached  to  them.  There  is  certainly  no  evidence  for
concluding  that  questions  of  liability  for  fire  were  settled  through
the  application  of  rules  derived  from  the  Roman  jurists  on  the
presence or  absence of  culpa.
In  later  cases the  reasoning  is  somewhat  different.  Mackintosh
v.  Mackintosh  21 is  another  case  arising  out  of  damage  caused  by
muirburn.  The  issue  debated  by  the  judges  was  the  degree  of  care
required  of  a  person  who  conducts  a  dangerous  activity  on  his
own  land.  Whereas  the  Lord  Ordinary  considered  that  the  highest
possible  degree  of  care  was  to  be  exercised  and  expressed  his  view
in  the  words  tenet  culpa  levissima,22  the  members  of  the  Inner
House,  rejecting  the  distinction  between  culpa  levis  and  culpa  levis-
sima,  held  that  the  defender  was  liable  if  he  had  failed  to  exercise
the  care  to  be  expected  of  a  prudent  man  in  the  circumstances.
Failure  to  exercise  such  care  constituted  culpa  or  negligence.23
The  contrast  between  strict  liability  and  liability  based  upon
culpa  is  brought  out  in  Chalmers  v.  Dixon  24 where  the  pursuers
had  sustained  damage  through  noxious  vapours  given  off  by  a heap
of  inflammable  material  on  the  defender's  property,  which  had
caught  fire.  The  pursuers  argued  that  the  defenders  were  liable
even  in  the  absence  of  culpa,  though  they  also  affirmed  that  culpa
could  be  shown.  The  defenders  denied  that  they  were  liable  with-
out  proof  of  negligence  or  culpa.  Although  the  judges  of  the Inner
House  found  for  the  pursuer  the  ground  of  their  decision  is  un-
certain.  Lords  Moncreiff  and  Neaves  held  that  the  mere  accumu-
lation  of  the  inflammable  materials  constituted  culpa.25  Lord
Ormidale  held  that  the  defenders  were  liable  for  the  escape  of  a
harmful  object  stored  on  their  land.  But  he  also  held  that  they
-
21 (1864) 2 M.  1357.  22 lbid.  1361.
23 Cf.  ibid.  at  1362 per  Lord  Neaves,  at  1363-1364  per  Lord  Cowan,  and  at  1364 per
Lord Inglis.
24  (1876)  3 R. 461.  25  lbid. 464.
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were liable  on  the  separate ground  of  culpa,  in  that  they had not
taken  proper  precautions  in  the  disposition  of  the  inflammable
material  or  exercised  the, utmost  diligence  in  the  control  of  the
fire.28  Lord  Gifford.  whose reasoning  is  the  least  clear.  distin-
guishes between an  " absolute  obligation  ,. and  an  obligation  de-
rived  from  " actual  culpa...  but  he also seems to  imply  that  what
is called  an  absolute liability  involves  a slight  degree of  fault  and
therefore may be expressed  in terms of culpa.27
In  both  Mackintosh  v. Mackintosh  and Chalmers v.  Dixon  the
Inner  House considered whether  there had been culpa  on the part
of  the  defender.  The  judges  understood  by  culpa  fault  or  negli-
gence;  sometimes.  more  specifically.  the  failure  to  exercise  the
degree of  care to  be  expected  of  a  prudent  man  is  taken  to  be
culpa.  Or  the matter  may  be considered in  a less general fashion
and the actual  circumstances which  have occurred held  to  disclose
culpa.  But  there is also evident  a willingness  to  qualify  as culpa
conduct  which  of  itself  betrays  little  in  the  way  of  fault  or  negli-
gence.  Although  one is able  to  deduce that  the  term  culpa  plays
a more  significant  role  in  the reasoning of  the later  cases than  in
that  of  the  earlier.  one cannot  deduce that  the rules expressed in
terms  of  culpa  in  Mackintosh  and Chalmers  are derived from  the
lex  Aquilia  or  other  Roman  material.  The  judges  have  simply
taken the word  culpa  and used it  in .the construction  of  arguments
which  consider the incidence of fault  or negligence.
Another  line  of  cases considers liability  for  damage incurred
by  property  through  the  state  of  neighbouring  premises.  The
earliest of  these. Cleghorn  v.  T  aylor .28  evidences a strict  approach
to  the  question  of  liability.  Where  a  badly  constructed  chimney
fell  and  damaged china  kept  in  an adjoining  shop. the court  held
that  the owner of the premises. not the person who had constructed
the  chimney  can,  was  liable.  Lord  Murray.  the  only  judge  to
speak of  culpa.  held  that  a proprietor  was liable  for  his failure  to
keep his premises in  a safe state even though  there  was " no bad
intention  or  special culpa  on his part... 29  Yet  in  Laurent  v.  Lord
Advocate.3o where  a  landlord  of  a  public  house sought  damages
for  loss  of  custom  brought  about  by  work  being  done  on  neigh-
bouring  premises, the court  rejected his argument that any invasion
26  lbid.  466--467.
27  lbid.  467-468.
28  (1856)  18  D.  664.
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of  another's property,  irrespective  of  " culpa  arising  through  negli-
gence or  unskilfulness,"  is wrongful.  Again  only  one judge, Lord
Kinloch,  spoke of  culpa.  He  stated that,  except in  a few  special
circumstances, a person can be made liable  in respect of  operations
conducted on his premises only  where there has been culpa on his
part.  Hence the  pursuer  could  not  succeed unless he could  show
that  the  defender's  works  were  improper,  illegal  or  negligently
conducted.31
Liability  for  damage resulting  from  the  escape of  water  has
been discussed in  terms  of  culpa.  The  most  interesting  case is
MofJatt  and Co. v. Park 32  in which  the pursuers brought  an action
in  respect of  damage suffered  by  goods stored  on  their  premises
through  the  bursting  of  a  waterpipe  on  the  defender's  premises.
The  court  on the whole  was concerned to show that  liability  arose
from  culpa,  not  from  the  mere fact  of  ownership,  but  that  culpa
might  be inferred  from  the circumstances in  which  the escape took
place.33  Certain  observations  of  Lord  Gifford,  and  especially  of
Lord  Moncreiff,34 suggest  that the mere existence of defective water-
pipes is sufficient to constitute culpa.35
With  the  advent  of  gas the issue again  was raised  whether  a
proprietor  was  strictly  liable  for  the  escape of  a  dangerous sub-
stance  from  his  premises.  The  Court  of  Session in  two  cases
affirmed  that for  liability  there must be culpa.  In  Miller  v. Robert
Addie  and  Sons'  Collieries  Ltd.36  Lords  Aitchison  and  Murray
understood  culpa  in  the  sense of  negligence; in  M'Laughlan  v.
Craig 31 Lord  Russell  understood  culpa  in  the sense of  breach of
the duty to exercise reasonable care.38
In  the  cases on  damage resulting  from  the  state in  which  pre-
mises are kept  or  from  the  escape of  water  or  gas, one has exhi-
bited  a  characteristic  use of  the  word  culpa.  Where  liability  in
these situations  is held  to depend upon culpa the point  being made
31 lbid.  614.
32 (1877) 5 R.  13.
33 Cf.  ibid.  at  15-16  per  Lord  Ormidale,  and at  17 per  Lord  Gifford.
34 Lord  Moncreiff  stated,  ibid.  18:  ..The  true  only  culpa  is  the  failure  of  the  pro-
prietor  to  fulfil  the  absolute  obligation  to  protect  his  neighbour  against  ordinary
contingencies,  which  is  nothing  but  a  breach  of  implied  obligation."
35 Cf.  also  Campbell  v.  Kennedy  (1864)  3  M.  121  where  Lords  Benholme  and  Inglis
emphasised  that  liability  did  not  arise  purely  ex  dominio  but  that  culpa  or  negli-
gence must  be  shown;  Hampton  v.  Galloway  and  Sykes  (1899)  I  F.  501,  judgment
of  the  Sheriff.
36 1934 S.C.  150, 1934 S.L.T.  160.
37 1948 S.C.  599,1948  S.L.T.  483.
36 lbid.  607.  Cf.  also  the  remarks  of  Lord  Wheatley  in  Gilmour  v.  Simpson,  1958
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is that the mere conduct  of  a certain  operation  or  the mere escape
of  water or  gas is not  of  itself  enough to impose liability  upon the
proprietor.  There  must  be present some element  of  fault.  It  is
perhaps not  too  fanciful  to  suggest that  ..culpa  "  is often  used in
preference  to  ., fault  "  because it  is  the  more  forceful  word;  it
carries a stronger implication  of  wrongdoing  and hence is suitable
in a context intended to stress  this element.
Culpa, as is stated in some of the judgments, may express faults
of  varying  degrees of  gravity.  It  may express some demonstrable
fault  on  the  part  of  the  person made liable,  some clear  piece of
wrongful  conduct,  or  it  may express a fault  which  is implied  from
the circumstances.  The court  may infer  that there has been wrong-
ful  behaviour,  even though  no specific misconduct  can be proved.
The  type  of  fault  expressed is  frequently  negligence, by  which  is
meant a failure  to  exercise care, or,  in  the later  cases, a breach of
a duty to take care.  Sometimes the particular  state of affairs under
consideration  is held  to  disclose culpa  (for  example, accumulation
of  dangerous materials,  failure  to  keep waterpipes  in  repair),  and
in  one instance culpa  is used in  the  sense of  breach of  an implied
obligation.
The  reasoning in  the  cases on  liability  for  animals  is  obscure.
There  is  discernible  on the one hand a view  which  contrasts liabi-
lity  based upon  culpa  with  liability  based upon  scientia,  and  on
the  other  hand  a view  which  attempts  to  subsume liability  based
upon  scientia  under  the head of  liability  based upon  culpa.  Both
views may be found  in the same judgment.  Thus Lord  Cranworth
who  delivered  the  leading  judgment  of  the  House  of  Lords  in
Fleming  v.  Orr 39  commenced his analysis by  drawing  a distinction
between knowledge  of  the  animal's  vicious  propensities  and culpa
or  negligence.40  But  he  concludes  with  the  observation  that  in
EnglisQ law liability  is based upon culpa and that an essential ingre-
dient  of  culpa  is knowledge  of  the animal's  vicious  propensities.41
Where  the person sought to be made liable  is not  the owner of
the  animal,  knowledge  of  vicious  propensities  has assumed a less
prominent  part  in the reasoning of the judges.  In Harpers v. Great
39 (1855)  2 Macq. 14.
40 lbid.  21.
41 lbid.  24.  Cf. also Clark v. Armstrong (1862)  24 D.  1315  in  which the court founded
its  interlocutor  that  there was no  liability  on  the  ground  of  culpa  or  negligence
upon absence  of  proof  that  the owner of  the offending animal knew of  its vicious
character;  and Mclnt)re  v.  Carmichael (1870) 8 M.  570 in  which  the  court  held
that  knowledge by  the owner of  a  sheepdog's  addiction to  worrying  sheep coupled
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North  of  Scotland  Railway  CO.'2 a bull  while  being led  down  the
street  by  servants of  the  defenders broke  loose  and  injured  the
pursuer.  Lord  Young  (with  whom  Lords  Craighill  and Rutherfurd
Oark  concurred)  stated  that  the  action  was  founded  not  upon
breach of  contract  but  upon  culpa  and that  since the noffilal  pre-
cautions had been taken in the conduct of the bull  along the street,
culpa had not been established.43
In  the  most  recent  case on  the  subject,  Henderson  v.  John
Stuart  (Farms) Ltd.,44 Lord  Hunter  attempted  to  state in  teffils  of
culpa  a coherent set of  rules  deteffilining  the liability  of  a person
for  damage  done  by  an  animal. 45  His  Lordship  distinguished
between the  duty  to  confine  effectually  incumbent  upon  a person
aware  of  an  animal's  vicious  propensities  and  the  duty  to  take
reasonable care that  an animal  should not  cause harnl.  In  Scots
law  breach  of  either  duty  constitutes  culpa  and  imposes liability.
When  considering  the  implications  of  the  duty  to  confine  effec-
tually,  Lord  Hunter  suggested that  culpa  would  noffilally  be pre-
sumed where an animal  known  to  be vicious  escaped.  However,
the  presumption  should  not  be  treated  as  irrebuttable.  Escape
through  act  of  God,  of  the  Queen  's enemies, or  through  the rash
inteffileddling  of  the person injured  precluded  culpa.'&
Although  judges when  dealing with  cases arising  from  damage
done by animals show a preference for  the language of  culpa, they
are not  applying  rules  derived  from  the  Roman  law.  They  were
required  to  decide whether  knowledge  of  an animal's  vicious  pro-
pensities itself  entailed liability  in cases  of damage or whether some
separate element  of  fault  needed to  be shown.  One again  has a
contrast  between a strict  liability  and  a liability  based upon  fault,
a contrast  which,  as in  other  contexts,  finds  a natural  expression
in  the language of  culpa.  Once judges have begun to express the
liability  in  teffils  of  culpa  they relate  it  to  liability  in  other  areas
of  the  law  of  reparation  also expressed in  terms  of  culpa.  They
are then induced  to  treat  liability  for  damage done by  animals as
an application  of  a general principle  of  liability  for  culpa.47
~
42  (1886)  13  R. 1139.
43 lbid.  1148-1149.  Cf.  also  Gray  v.  North  British  Ry.  (1890)  18  R.  76,  judgment
of  Lord  Inglis.  44 1963 S.C. 245,  1963 S.L.T.  22.
45 Lord  Hunter's observations  appear to  apply to  a person (whether or  not the owner)
who has custody of an animal.
4& 1963 S.C. 245, 247 et  seq.  Cf.  also the dissenting judgment of  Lord  Johnston in
Milligan v. Henderson. 1915  S.C. 1030,  1043; 1915,  2 S.L.T. 156.
47 Cf.  especially the  approach of  Lord  Hunter  in  Henderson v.  John Stuart (Farms)
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In  the  second group  of  cases, those  dealing  with  death  and
personal injuries,  culpa appears frequently  in the language of advo-
cates and  judges.  Sometimes arguments are expressed simply  in
terms  of  culpa,  sometimes resort  is had  to  the maxim  culpa  tenet
suos auctores.  I  have studied  the use of  the maxim  in  an earlier
paper 48  and the conclusions reached may briefly  be restated.  The
maxim  is  often  cited  by  judges  as the  first  and  most  basic prin-
ciple  of  the  Scots law  of  reparation.  Yet  it  does not  appear  to
have  been extensively  used until  the  latter  part  of  the nineteenth
century  and its use is confined  to cases  raising an issue of  the type,
which  of  two  or more persons is the appropriate  defender?  O1ar-
acteristically  the  maxim  supplies a reason for  the conclusion  that
a person who  has not  caused loss should  not  be made liable.  In
some cases  it  is advanced successfully, in others unsuccessfully.  A
particular  sphere of  its  application  is  to  be found  in  cases which
turn  upon  the doctrine  of  common  employment.  Judges are fond
of citing  the maxim  as a justification  for  the doctrine.
Where  the  word  culpa  alone  or  the  phrases culpa  lata,  levis,
levissima occur in the reasoning of advocates or judges a particular
reason for  their  occurrence is often  discernible.  There was a point
in  the  development  of  the  law  at  whiCh it  was uncertain  whether
a master without  fault  on his own part could be made liable for  loss
caused by a servant.  The issue focuses attention  upon  the element
of  fault  and  may  lead to  the adoption  of  the forceful  language of
culpa.  In  Baird  v. Hamilton,49 for  example, a servant through  his
carelessness  in  managing a horse and cart entrusted  to  him  by his
master knocked  over and injured  a child.  The master argued that
he could  be made liable  ex culpa  of  his servant only  if  there had
been some blame  or  negligence on  his  part  and  cited  in  support
the  maxim  culpa  tenet  suos auctores.  He  suggested that  culpa
might  be attributed  to  him  if  he had assigned to  the servant more
horses than  he could  possibly  manage, or  if  he had  employed  a
servant  who  had  shown  himself  to  be careless in  the  past.  The
court,  without  making  use of  the  notion  of  culpa,  rejected  these
arguments on the ground  that  a master was liable  for  the careless-
ness of  his servant occurring  in  the course of  employment;50
"  "  Culpa  tenet  SUDS  auctores:  the  Application  of  a Principle  in  Scots  Law,"  1973 J.R.
159.
.9  (1826) 4 S. 790.
50 Cf.  also  McLean  v.  Russell.  Macnee  &  Co.  (1850)  12  D.  887,  892  where  Lord
Mackenzie  remarks  on  the  constructive  culpa  in  the  employment  of  careless persons;
McEwan  v.  Cuthill  (1897)  25  R.  57,  63  per  Lord  Young  and  64  per  Lord  Trayner.23 CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS  LAWOF  REPARATION
Later  cases accept the  proposition  that  masters are liable  for
the delicts of their  servants committed  in the course of employment,
irrespective  of  personal culpa  on the part  of  the master.  Some of
them  are concerned with  the  question  whether  the  seriousness of
the fault  committed  by  the servant is relevant to tlle  amount  of the
damages.  Again  the language of culpa is to  be found.  In  Cooley
v.  Edinburgh  and  Glasgow Railway  CO.51  Lord  Jeffray  held  that
the measure of  damages depended upon  whether  the culpa  of  the
defenders'  servants had  been gross or  venial.52  The  view  repre-
sented by  Lord  Jeffray  was rejected in  two  cases at the beginning
of  the  twentieth  century.  Lord  Johnston  in  Hillcoat  v.  Glasgow
and  South  Western Railway  CO.53  held  that  the  degree of  negli-
gence was not  relevant  to  the  question  of  damages and  that  the
distinction  between culpa  levis  and culpa  lata  formed  no  part  of
this  branch  of  the law.  In  Black  v.  North  British  Railway  Co.,
decided in  the  same year  ,54  the Inner  House affirmed  the  opinion
of  Lord  Johnston  and  rejected  the  defender's contention  that  the
damages should be increased if  culpa lata was shown.
Another  aspect of  the relationship  between master and servant
that  finds  expression in  the  language of  culpa  is  the  liability  of
the  master  for  injuries  suffered  by  the  servant  in  the  course  of
employment.  In numerous cases  throughout  the nineteenth century
persons  employed  in  factories,  mines  or  the  railways  (or  their
dependants) seek to  recover  damages from  their  employers for  in-
juries  sustained from  allegedly  defective  machinery  or  equipment.
There  is an attempt  on the part  of  the employee to argue that  the
master is absolutely  liable  for  the state of his machinery  or  equip-
ment.  This  attempt  is  resisted by  the  courts  who  stress that  the
master cannot be made liable without  fault  on his part, even though
fault  may  sometimes  be  inferred  from  the  state  in  which  the
machinery  or equipment is kept.  The requirement  of fault  is often
expressed with the word culpa.
Some examples follow.  Lord  Mackenzie in Sneddon v. Addie  55
held  that  the employer  must not  be taken as warranting  absolutely
the safety of  his machinery;  he is not  liable  if  he has taken all  the
precautions  that  a careful  man would  have taken.  His  Lordship,
51  (1845)  8 D. 288.
52  Cf.  also  Black  v. Croall  (1854)  16  D. 431.
53  1908  S.C.  454,  reported  in a note  to Black  v. North  British  Ry.
54  1908  S.C.  444,  (1908)  15  S.L.T.  840.
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whose remarks  have been abbreviated  by  the reporter,  appears to
have  stated  that  for  liability  there must  be culpa  and  that  culpa
levis  (the  failure  to  exercise  strict  diligence)  is  sufficient.66  In
Ovington  v.  McVicar,67  a case arising  out  of  the death of  an em-
ployee  caused by  defective  machinery,  Lords  Inglis,  Cowan  and
Benholme held that  the master was not  liable  unless there had been
culpa on his part.58
There  is no  point  in  setting out  the details  of  all  the cases on
deaths  or  physical  injury  which  contain  allegations  of  culpa  or
decisions  framed  in  terms  of  culpa.59  In  most  of  the  cases no
particular  significance  can  be attached  to  the  choice  of  the word
culpa.  A  few,  however,  are  more  instructive  and  it  is  possible
to  see why  a judge  should  have framed  his reasoning or  decision
in  terms  of  culpa.  In  Innes  v.  Magistrates  of  Edinburgh  60 the
pursuer  was injured  when he fell  into  a  pit  dug in  a lane during
some building  operations.  The  evidence showed that  gaps in  the
fence surrounding  the pit  were caused sometimes through  the care-
lessness of  the  workmen,  sometimes through  the removal  of  bars
by third  persons.  In holding  the defenders liable the court observed
that  they  were liable  for  the  smallest neglect of  the duty  to  keep
the  streets  safe  and  that  the  accident  could  not  have  happened
without  some degree of  culpa  on their  part.  The  court  wanted to
make clear that  the defenders were not absolutely liable; there must
be some fault.  But  the  circumstances  of  the  accident  were such
that they were prepared to infer  fault  on the part of the defenders.61
In  some cases  a contrast is drawn  between liability  arising from
breach of  a contractual  obligation  and liability  arising from  delict.
56 Lord  Mackenzie's  opinion  was  followed  by  Lord  Ivory  in  Gray  v.  Brassey  (1852)
15 D.  135, 141.
57 (1864)  2 M.  1066.
58 Cf.  also Cook  v.  Duncan (1857) 20 D.  180, argument of  defender; Cray v.  North
British  Ry.  (1863) 1 M.  670, 671, argument of  pursuer;  Bowie v.  Rankin  (1886) 13
R.  981, 982 per the Sheriff;  Ramsey v.  Robin, McMillan  &  Co. (1889) 16 R.  690,
693 per  Lord  Young;  Morris  v.  Boase Spinning Co.  Ltd.  (1895) 22 R.  336, 340
per Lord  Young;  Wilson v.  Love  (1897) 25 R,  280, 281 per  the Sheriff-substitute
and Sheriff.
5V Cf.  for  example Lumsden v.  Russell (1856) 18 D.  468 per the Lord  Ordinary;  Bal-
four  v.  Baird and Brown  (1857) 20 D.  238, 244 per Lord  Cowan, and 245, 246 per
Lord  Ardmillan;  Sneddon v.  Langloan  Iron  Co.  (1862) 24 D.  569, argument of
pursuer;  King  v.  Pollock  (1874) 2 R.  42, 43 per  the SherifI-substitute; McFeat  v.
Rankin's Trustees  (1879)  6 R.  1043,  argument of defenders; McQuade v.  Wm. Dixon
LId.  (1887) 14 R.  1039, 1041 per  Lord  Young;  Morrison  v.  McAra  (1896) 23 R.
564, 5M  per the Sheriff-substitute; McKenzie v.  Magistrates of  Musselburgh (1901)
3 F. 1023,  1026  per Lord Young.
60 (1798)  Mor.  13189.
61 Possibly one has a similar use of  culpa in  Reilly  v.  Greenfield Coal and Brick  Co.
Ltd. 1909  S.C. 1328,  1333  per Lord Johnston, 1900  2 S.L.T. 171.25 CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS  LAW  OF  REPARATION
Cu[pa  may  be  used  broadly  to  express  delictual  in  contrast  to
contractual  obligation.  In  Birrell  v.  Anstruther  62  the widow  and
children  of  a schoolmaster brought  an action  for  damages on  the
ground  that  the  death  of  the  schoolmaster had  occurred  through
the  defender's  failure  to  keep  the  schoolhouse in  proper  repair .
Lord  Inglis,  dismissing the  action,  held  that  it  was founded  upon
culpa  and that  failure  to keep the schoolhouse in  repair  may have
been a  breach  of  obligation  but  did  not  constitute  cu[pa  causing
the death.63
In  Cramb  v.  Caledonian  Rai[way  CO.64  representatives of  per-
sons who  had  died  from  eating  sugar contaminated  through  con-
tact  with  leaking  tins  of  weedkiller  sued the  defenders who  had
custody  of  the sugar and  weedkiller  at  the time  of  contamination,
and in  Gordon  v.  McHardy  65  the father  of  a child  killed  through
eating a tin  of  poisoned salmon sued the grocer who had supplied
it.  The  Lord  Ordinary  in  the  former  case pointed  out  that  the
ground  of  liability  was cu[pa not breach of contract.  He held that
the defenders were liable  in  that  they had broken  the duty  to take
reasonable precautions for  the life  and safety of their  neighbours.66
The  defender  in  the  latter  case argued  that  the ground  of  action
was culpa  not  breach of  contract  and  that  a retail  dealer was not
liable  ex de[icto  for  latent  defects in  specific articles  sold to  a cus-
tomer.  This  argument appears to have been accepted by the court
who dismissed the action.67
Finally  one may  consider  the  use of  cu[pa  in  Eisten  v.  North
British  Rai[way  CO.68  Two  sisters brought  an  action  of  assyth-
ment in  respect of  the death of  their  brother  in a railway  accident.
The court  held  that  the action  of  assythment was incompetent  and
that  no other  ground  of  action  was to be found.  The approach of
the judges was to assume that any possible action other than assyth-
ment  must  be  founded  upon  culpa  (understood  in  the  sense of
fault).69  It  was the search for  a relevant ground  of  action  that  led
them to speak of cu[pa.
62 (1866) 5 M.  20.
&3 lbid.  23
64 (1892)  19 R.  1054.
65 (1903) 6 F.  210.
66 His  judgment  was  reversed  on  appeal  but  the  judges  of  the  Inner  House  appear  to
have accepted his analysis  of  the law.
67 Cf.  also  the  observations  of  Lord  Young  in  Harpers  v.  Great  North  of  Scotland
Ry.  (1886) 13 R.  1139, 1148.
68 (1870)  8 M.  980.
69 Cf.  ibid.  982 per  the  Lord  Ordinary,  984 per  Lord  Inglis  and  986 per  Lord  Ardmillan.26 CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS  LAW  OF  REPARATION
Only  in  one  case is  there  a  specific  reference  to  the  Roman
law.  In  Linwood  v.  Vans Hathorn  70  the pursuer sought damages
for  the  death of  her husband killed  by  a tree felled  on the defen-
der's estate.  The  judges  by  a  majority  found  that  no fault  could
be attributed  to  the defender.  Lord  Craigie,  dissenting, applied  a
passage  in the Institutes of Justinian 71  :
Item  si  putator  ex  arbore  deiecto ramo  servum  tuum  transe-
untem  occiderit,  si prope  viam  publicam  aut  vicinalem  id fac-
tum est neque praeclamavit,  ut casus evitari  possit, culpae reus
est:  si  praeclamavit  neque ille  curavit  cavere, extra  culpam
est putator.72
The  Lord  Justice-Oerk  also referred  to  the passage cited by Lord
Craigie  but  held  that  on  the facts  the conditions  established by  it
for  the attachment of liability  were not present.73
The  material  collected  and  analysed  above  does not  support
the proposition  that  the Scots law  of reparation  derived a principle
or  doctrine  of  culpa  from  Roman  law  in  general or  from  the lex
Aquilia  in  particular.  Some early cases  contain  citations  from  the
corpus  iuris  civilis  in  the  arguments  of  counselor  the  reasoning
of  judges.  But  the  sporadic  reliance  on  texts from  the Digest  or
Institutes  which  use the term  culpa  does not  prove  that  Scots law
extracted from  the Roman sources and applied a principle  of culpa.
Possibly not  all  the cases in  which  advocates or  judges cited  texts
from  the  corpus  iuris  have  been reported;  in  some of  the  cases
which  have been reported  citation  of  texts may h~ve been omitted.
Nevertheless it  is  apparent  that  there  was no  requirement  of,  or
consistent practice in, their citation.
The  more  frequent  occurrence in  the  cases of  the  word  culpa
itself  without  a specific reference to  the Roman  law  shows merely
that  some advocates and judges preferred  to  reason with  the help
of  a  word  derived  from  Roman  law.  It  does not  show  that  the
rules  or  principles  which  they  expressed in  terms  of  culpa  were
derived from  Roman law.
One  should  not  leave the point  without  considering  a further
argument  that  might  be  raised.  The  law  of  contract  appears to
have been developed rather  earlier  than  the law  of  reparation.  Is
70 14 May  1817, F.C.  327.
71 Ibid.  334.
72 Just. Inst.  4.3.5.
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it  possible  that  the  courts  applied  a  principle  of  culpa  derived
from  Roman  law  to  the solution  of  contractual  problems and later
utilised  the principle  in  the construction  of  the law  of  reparation ?
Cases from  the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which  discuss
questions of  liability  in  terms  of  culpa  lata,  levis  or  levissima  or
of dolus and culpa are prominent  in three areas of the law:  liability
under  fue  edict  on  nautae,  stabularii  and  caupones,74  mandate 75
and  locatio  conductio.76  Very  few  of  these cases contain  direct
citations  of  texts  on  culpa  drawn  from  the  corpus  iuris  civilis.77
In  some there are garbled, unacknowledged quotations from  texts.78
Probably  in  a number  of  cases  texts were cited and have not  been
included  in  the  report.  Yet  the  impression  one  obtains  is  that
advocates and judges constructed their  reasoning in  terms of culpa
lata, levis and levissima and the degrees of diligentia  to be expected
from  an  individual,  without  examining  or  adopting  the  specific
decisions given  by  the  Roman  jurists.  To  say that  Scots lawyers
in  the  seventeenth and  eighteenth  centuries  took  from  Roman
sources a principle  of culpa and applied  it  to contractual  situations
would,  I  think,  be a misrepresentation.  They  make a considerable
use of words and phrases taken from  Roman  law; that is all.  Hence
the  development  of  the  law  of  contract  does not  help  those who
wish  to  derive  the law  of  reparation  from  a principle  of culpa.
Judicial  statements that a principle  or doctrine  of culpa is basic
to  the law  of  reparation  are not  found  until  the latter  part  of  the
nineteenth  century  and the twentieth  century.  They  imply  accept-
ance of  a particular  view  of  the way  in  which  the law  developed.
To  say that  a principle  is basic or fundamental  to the law, appears
to  be an  assertion about  the  origin  of  the law.  The  principle  is
postulated  as a datum  from  which  the law  developed or  grew.  If
the  legal  system or  a particular  branch  of  the law  is traced  from
74 Sibbald v.  Rosyth (1658) Mor.  13976; Master of  Forbes v.  Steil (1687) Mor.  9233;
Chisholm v.  Fenton (1714)  Mor.  9241; Hay v.  Wordsworth, 13 Feb. 1801,  F.C. 496.
75 Anderson  (1583) Mor.  10082;  McNeil,  Rawling  v.  Dauling  (1696) Mor.  10085;
Wood  v.  Fullarton  (1710) Mor.  13960; Gillon  v.  Drummond  (1724) Mor.  3522;
Arnot  v.  Stewart, 25 Nov.  1813,  F.C. 462, 465 per Lord  Meadowbank.
76 Mowat  (1626) Mor.  10074; Binny v.  Veaux (1679) Mor.  10079; Trotter v.  Buchallan
(1688) Mor.  10081; Lawrie  v.  Angus  (1677) Mor.  10107; Deans v.  Abercromby
(1681) Mor.  10122; Sutherland v.  Robertson (1736) Mor.  13979; Sinclair v.  Hutchi.
son (1751) Mor.  10130; Swinton v.  McDougals,  16 Jan. 1810, F.C.  487;  Kincaid
v.  Oswald (1709) B.S. 759; Davidson (1749) Mor.  10081; Gordon v.  Slraiton (1677)
B.S. 211; Maxwell v. Todrige (1684)  Mor.  10079.
77 Anderson (1583) Mor.  10082; Kincaid  v.  Oswald (1709) B.S. 759.
78 Master  of  Forbes v.  Steil (1687) Mor.  9233; Binny  v.  Veaux (1679) Mor.  10079;
Swinton v.  McDougals,  16 Jan. 1810, F.C.  487.  Cf.  also a case on commodatum,
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a given  point  in  time  it  is assumed that  from  that  point  the prin-
ciple  has been consistently  employed  as a guide  for  the  framing
of rules.
Such a view  of  the  development  of  dIe law  is incorrect.  One
may  say that  in  the  course of  the eighteenth  and nineteenth  cen-
tunes judges sometimes used the language of culpa in certain  areas
of the law.  Once a series of decisions within  the field of reparation
framed  in  terms  of  culpa  had  been built  up,  it  was possible for
judges and  others to  infer  the existence of  a principle.  Decisions
reached subsequently  might  invoke  or  be  justified  by  an  appeal
to the principle.  If  some such development is understood one may
speak of a principle  of culpa operating within  the law of reparation.
But  a  qualification  of  the  principle  as basic  or  fundamental  is
misleading.
The statement that  a principle  of culpa (which might  be formu-
lated as liability  in the Scots law of reparation  is based upon culpa)
emerged in  the latter  part  of  the nineteenth century  requires some
modification.  There  is  no  unanimity  of  expression  on  the  part
of  judges either  in  the cases decided before  the emergence of  dIe
principle  or  in  those which  contain  appeals to  it.  Frequently  it  is
only  one judge  of  the court  who  expresses  his  reasoning in  terms
of culpa or invokes the principle,  and indeed culpa appears to have
been a  word  preferred  by  certain  judges.  More  common  is  the
expression of  issues on  the  part  of  advocates and judges in  terms
of the words " fault  " and " negligence." 79
The  circumstances  in  which  an  appeal  might  be made  to  dIe
principle  are of great variety.  Yet  one should note that  it  appears
to  have  been  invoked  with  particular  frequency  in  cases where
there  has been a  doubt  as to  the basis of  liability.  At  one point
it  was  uncertain  whether  a  master  was liable  for  loss caused by
his  servant  in  the  absence of  personal fault,  whether  a proprietor
was absolutely  liable  for  the  consequences of  dangerous activities
conducted  on  his  land  or  for  the  state  of  his  premises,  or  an
employer  for  injuries  sustained by  his  workmen  in  the course of
their  employment,  or  what  precisely were the conditions  entailing
liability  for  damage done by  animals.  Not  only  do  the courts  in
the  process of  settling  the  rule  to  be  applied  in  these situations
79  The word culpa is never  used  in the formulation  of issues  to be put before  a jury.
Where  an issue  on a question  of fault is put before  a jury the standard  phrase  used
is " fault or negligence."  Cf. McLachlan  v. Gordon  (1855)  17 D. 773.29 CULPA  IN  THE  SCOTS  LAW  OF  REPARATION
bring  into  relief  the element of  fault,  expressed in  terms of  cu[pa,
but  these situations  appear  to  have provided  the  medium  for  the
creation  of the principle.  It  was jn areas Where the basis of liability
was doubtful  that  the  pressure for  the  emergence and  utiljsation
of a principle  was strongest.8o
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